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Abstract
Innovation in digital technology has allowed rapid growth in mobile telephone and Internet adoption 
among consumers. The implication underlying the high rates of subscription growth is that consumers 
generally place a high valuation on telecommunication services. Moreover, since mobile telephone and 
Internet are predominantly telecommunication services, it is reasonable to presume that the network 
effect may be largely responsible for this growth. The implication of the network effect, where the 
consumer’s valuation of service increases with the size of the network is that subscription growth is 
endogenous. However, to date there have been few attempts to measure the change in consumer 
welfare as networks increase. Following Hausman (1981), this paper measures the change in consumer 
surplus based on the compensating variations approach. The result is an annual measure of the change 
in consumer surplus for the representative consumer for the OECD region. In addition, the approach 
reveals whether marginal consumer surplus is a decreasing or increasing function of network size. 
Measurement of the change in consumer welfare thus provides an additional tool for public policy 
analysis.
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I. Introduction 
 
Since the early-1990s, mobile telephony and Internet network subscription sustained rapid growth in 
Europe (Welfens and Jungmittag, 2003). Pricing, technical innovation and regulatory framework 
change are seen as important to continued network growth. In March 2002, the European Union 
adopted a package of Directives that significantly revised the 1998 regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services in Europe. In particular, the new regulatory 
approach seeks to be responsive to technological and market developments by being more neutral in 
its treatment of similar services provided via alternative technical means (such as narrowband, 
broadband and mobile), and by allowing regulation to be withdrawn as effective competition develops 
(Cawley 2004). However, as mobile telephony and the Internet are network delivered services, 
positive demand externality effects may also be important in explaining such network growth. That is, 
when network externalities are important, consumers’ valuation of network subscription is increased 
with network size—or equivalently—subscription can expand independently of any change to market 
conditions. Should network effects be shown to be empirically important in explaining network 
evolution, then they should also be considered in future regulatory framework changes. 
 
This study develops a procedure to determine the importance of network effects. Model estimates 
provide an annual measure of consumer welfare change for the representative OECD region 
subscriber. Following Hausman (1981), our model is based on the compensating variation (CV) 
approach, which consists in assessing welfare improvement due to a price fall as the extra income the 
consumer would be willing to accept in place of the price fall. Further, the study indicates the welfare 
gain, as measured by CV, decreases with network size. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section II states the methodology and shows how Hausman’s CV 
formula may be adapted to the context of a dynamic demand model incorporating network effects, as 
specified by Madden et al. (2004). The demand system is such that current network size depends on 
the past size of the network, and expectations for future size. This specification reflects the dynamic 
optimising behaviour by a representative consumer whose subscription choice is influenced by a 
2 
telecommunications service network effect. Section III reports model parameter estimates based on 
annual OECD data for 30 Member States for the period 1996 through 2000. CV values are 
constructed from the parameter estimates and discussed. The services considered are fixed-line and 
mobile telephony, and the Internet. Section IV concludes. 
 
II. Methodology 
 
A feature of electronic communication networks is that consumers receive more utility the larger is 
the subscriber base. That is, a consumer’s welfare increases monotonically with the network size 
(Squire 1973; Rohlfs 1974). Accordingly, the presence of a network effect impacts on both current 
subscriber and marginal non-subscriber welfare. That is, for subscribers, network subscription growth 
provides greater consumer welfare. Further, marginal non-subscribers are more likely to subscribe, at 
current prices, the larger is network subscription. To identify the increase in consumer welfare due to 
a price fall then requires the separation of any consumer welfare gain due to a movement along the 
subscription demand curve (direct price effect), from any indirect welfare gain originating from 
network expansion (network externality effect). 
 
Hausman (1981) uses the CV method to measure consumer welfare rise in response to a price fall for 
a non-network good. The change in consumer welfare induced by a network effect is obtained by 
adapting Hausman’s (1997) measure of the change in consumer welfare caused by the introduction of 
a new good. The consumer welfare change is obtained by treating the prevailing subscription price, 
before the price change, as the reservation price of a new subscriber, i.e., the price at which she will 
decide to subscribe. As such, the network’s growth leads to a change in the current reservation price. 
With the reservation price change identified, the variation to consumer welfare is then calculated. 
 
Compensating Variation and Hausman’s approach 
A price fall impacts on the demand for any given good in two different ways. First, the price fall has 
an effect which is equivalent to an income increase, stimulating demand for the good considered and 
for all other goods (income effect). Second, it makes the consumer demand less for other goods and 
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more for the good considered, the relative price of which is lowered (substitution effect). In order to 
separate the income effect from the substitution effect, consider a two-step process. In the first step 
(substitution effect), price is lowered from its initial to its final level, while the income effect is 
controlled by lowering income simultaneously with price, so as to hold utility constant. In the second 
step (income effect), price remains unchanged whereas the initial level of income is restored. By 
definition, the income removed in the first step, and then restored in the second step, is the 
compensating variation, CV. The CV is interpreted as the amount that the consumer should be 
compensated if he were not to benefit from the price fall, i.e., CV is the exact measure of the change 
in consumer welfare caused by a price fall. 
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Fig. 1: Compensating variation CV 
 
Defining the compensated demand function as the hypothetical demand that would prevail under 
compensating income variation (during the first step), CV measure is simply the area A in Fig. 1, viz., 
the area lying to the left of the compensated demand curve, between the initial and the final price 
lines, P0 and P1. The difficulty is that compensated demand functions are not readily obtainable from 
market data. Only uncompensated demand functions are observed, indicating equilibrium demand at 
given prices and income. Now, using the uncompensated demand curve instead of the compensated 
demand curve leads to an inexact measure of welfare change. In particular, this measure includes the 
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income effect, and based on consumer surplus variation SV, results in the area A+B in Fig. 1, rather 
than on the compensating variation CV. A sufficient condition for CS and SV to be equivalent is that 
the marginal utility of income is constant, which is not generally consistent with observed behaviour1. 
The measurement of CV, not SV, is thus required in order to obtain a proper assessment of welfare 
change. 
 
Hausman (1981) employed the microeconomic theory of consumer behaviour to derive the 
unobserved compensated demand curve from the observed uncompensated demand curve. From the 
observed demand function, and Roy’s identity (see Appendix), the expenditure function2 is first 
derived, i.e., the variable income the consumer must be allocated when price varies in order to keep 
her utility constant. Then, the compensated demand function is obtained as the derivative of the 
expenditure function with respect to price. Finally, CV, i.e., the exact measure of welfare variation due 
to a price change, is calculated. 
 
The case of  network goods 
Next, Hausman’s approach must be adapted to the context of network goods. Following Madden et 
al. (2004), an uncompensated network demand equation system is first specified as: 
 
1 2 3
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where  is the demand for service i  at time  (defined in terms of the size of network ), ,i tN t i ,i tP  is 
the price of subscription to network i  and  is the real per capita income. The response of demand 
to a price fall is indicated by parameter 
tY
iP  (for a normal good 0iP 
 ). Besides the price effect, 
                                                     
1 This condition requires that indifference curves are collinear. Decreasing marginal utility of income produces a 
compensated demand curve steeper than the corresponding uncompensated demand curve, and results in SV 
being an inexact measure of welfare. 
2 The prime approach to the analysis of consumer behaviour involves the maximisation of a strictly quasi-
concave utility function, subject to some budget constraint. The dual approach considers the minimisation of the 
expenditure function, subject to utility being set at or greater than some prescribed level. When the indirect 
utility function is monotonically increasing in income, and the expenditure function is monotonically increasing 
in utility, either function can be inverted to derive the other corresponding function. 
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increasing network size at time  leads to another impact on demand at time t ,  i.e., a network 
effect indicated by parameter 
1t 
ii  ( 0 1ii
 
 ). Also, as the current size  of network i  is a 
function of network size  in the next period, an anticipated fall in future price 
,i tN
,i tN 1 , 1i tP   for network 
 yields an increase in current subscription if i 0  . Moreover,   implies the anticipated fall in 
the price of network  induces a current period increase in subscription for network . A permanent 
price fall implies a larger increase in current subscription than for a temporary price fall, since the 
permanent price fall combines a fall in current and all future prices. 
3 0ij 
j i
 
Following Hausman’s approach (see Appendix), the exact measure, CVi,t , of change in consumer 
welfare due to a price change from Pi,t to Pi,t+1 ,  is then calculated as: 
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The compensating variation CVi,t reflects a movement along the compensated demand curve and 
reflects the direct price effect on welfare. 
 
In order to assess the network effect from (2), one has to determine the change , 1 ,i t i tP P
,i t

, 1N N  
 in 
reservation subscription price which produces a one unit increase in network size, . 
For new subscribers, the size of the network is just large enough to induce them to join at the 
prevailing subscription price. Assuming network size is perfectly observable, and subscribers are able 
to join at any time, the prevailing network subscription price is equal to new subscriber’s reservation 
price 
1i t
*
iP 3. Then, calculating the change in the reservation price 
*
iP  with respect to a network 
subscription  increase gives iN
* / (1 ) /i i ii iPP N      , which being negative reveals the reservation 
                                                     
3 Within a representative consumer framework, for a new subscriber over time, demand is zero until the market 
price falls to a level below the subscriber’s reservation price. To measure the change in consumer welfare for a 
marginal increase in network size then appears quite similar to measuring a change in consumer welfare with the 
introduction of a new service, as Hausman (1997) asserts the correct price for a new good in the pre-
introduction period is the reservation price, i.e. the virtual price which sets demand equal to zero. 
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price decreases in network subscription. The change in consumer welfare induced by a unit increase in 
network size (from  to ,i t iN N , 1 1i t iN N   ) and a fall in reservation price 
*
, 1 , / (i t i t i iP P P N 1 ) /ii iP       , (2) becomes 
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Equation (3) measures the change in welfare at time t due to the price adjustment caused by a unitary 
network increase. 
 
III. OECD Consumer Surplus Change 
 
Biannual rental price data are required to estimate (2) and (3). These data are collected for 30 OECD 
Member Country markets for 1996, 1998 and 2000 from the OECD Communications Outlook (1997, 
1999, 2001, 2003). Annual quantity (network size) and income data for 1996 to 2000 are obtained 
from the International Telecommunication Union World Telecommunications Indicators Database (2003).4 
Fixed-line price data are the fixed component of the OECD’s basket of residential telephony charges. 
Mobile telephony price is the fixed component of the OECD’s basket of consumer mobile telephony 
charges. Internet price is the OECD’s Internet access basket for 20 hours using discounted PSTN 
rates. Income (GDP per capita) and price data are denominated in United States dollars (US$) 
according to OECD purchasing power parity. Both income and prices are deflated by the US CPI to 
allow comparison through time. Fixed-line telephony quantity is the number of main telephone lines. 
Mobile telephony quantity is mobile telephone subscribers, while Internet quantity is the number of 
Internet users. Quantity variables are per 100 persons. The resulting index data is comprised of 79 
observations. 
 
The demand function specification (1) is from Madden et al (2004), a perfect foresight model that 
holds the marginal utility of wealth constant for each individual, but allows variation across 
4 An implicit assumption in using these data, following Becker et al. (1994), is that per capita telecommunications 
consumption reflects the behaviour of a representative consumer. 
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individuals. Thus, in the present context, the intercepts ( 0i ) in the cross-country model capture, in 
part, country-specific variation of the marginal utility of wealth. The specification is relaxed further by 
allowing time-specific effects to capture unanticipated growth in wealth. Deviations in country- and 
time-specific means are captured by adding an argument for per capita income to the demand 
function, which is associated with changes in marginal wealth across countries and through time. The 
resulting augmentation is a two-way (country and time) effects model. In addition, given there is a 
possibility for simultaneity between network effects, the regression model is specified as a standard 
form vector autoregressive model. Estimates of the network, price and income coefficients for fixed-
line and mobile telephony, and Internet service are from Madden et al.5 
 
Table I. Network, Price and Income Coefficients Estimates 
 Fixed-line Mobile Internet 
ii  0.96240 0.86260 0.96510 
iP  -0.00256 -0.00497 -0.02889 
	  0.00015 0.00045 0.00025 
Source: Madden et al. (2004) 
Table I presents estimates of network, price and income coefficients for fixed-line and mobile 
telephony and Internet services, respectively. All coefficient estimates are correctly signed and 
significant. Table II reports estimates of the change in welfare resulting from a fall in price. As shown, 
a price fall has an immediate impact on CV of 0.1%-0.2% of income. From Table II, a fall in mobile 
telephone subscription price provides the most direct benefit to consumers after 2000, followed by 
that for fixed-line service. Table III shows the indirect (or network externality) effect on welfare in 
fixed-line and mobile telephony and Internet service, respectively. CV estimates indicate that the 
benefit derived from a small increase in network size is large relative to that for the direct price effect. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 The presence of unobserved components means that two-stage instrumental variables estimation is required. 
Past network size is an endogenous variable because of the dependence of network size on the unobserved 
components. However, caution is required when implementing instrumental variables since, as Nelson and 
Startz (1990) warn, the use of lagged values as instruments when estimating stochastic Euler equations can lead 
to bias. Thus, instruments for network size are restricted to future access and use prices. Particular care is taken 
to ensure instruments are good predictors of network size. The resulting equations are estimated in Limdep 8.0 
using the unbalanced panel data set described above. 
Table II. Direct Welfare Gain by Telecommunications Service 
Service Year Subscription per 100 persons CV (US$) CV / Income 
Fixed-line 1996 50 28 0.001 
 1998 52 31 0.001 
 2000 54 33 0.001 
Mobile 1996 13 13 0.001 
 1998 26 26 0.001 
 2000 56 56 0.002 
Internet 1996 6 6 0.001 
 1998 15 15 0.001 
 2000 29 28 0.001 
Note. Benchmark is actual annual demand. 
 
Table III. Indirect Welfare Gain by Telecommunications Service 
Service Year Subscription per 100 persons CV (US$) CV / Income 
Fixed-line 1996 50 58 0.003 
 1998 52 58 0.003 
 2000 54 57 0.002 
Mobile 1996 13 22 0.001 
 1998 26 18 0.001 
 2000 56 10 0.000 
Internet 1996 6 41 0.002 
 1998 15 41 0.002 
 2000 29 41 0.002 
Note. Benchmark is actual annual demand. 
Table III reveals the relative welfare benefit (relative increase in CV) at 2000 from a network effect 
for fixed-line telephony subscribers is almost 6 times larger than that for mobile telephony 
subscribers. This finding is in part explained by the relatively large fall in reservation price 
iPii  /)1(  , for mobile telephony (-27.7) compared to that for fixed-line telephony (-14.7). Adding to 
the difference in magnitude is the negative scale factor /iP 	 , which is -17.1, -11.0 and -115.6 for 
fixed-line and mobile telephony demand, and Internet demand, respectively. The ratio indicates the 
relative importance of price-to-income effects on network growth. The greater is the magnitude of 
the ratio the greater the impact on CV. While differences in scale explain some of the difference in 
CV for 1996, the scale effect has a negligible impact by 2000. Thus, the difference in valuation is due 
mainly to relative access prices between fixed-line and mobile telephone service. Table III also reveals 
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that the welfare gain, as measured by annual CV, decreases with network size. Namely, an 8% growth 
in the fixed-line network accords with an inelastic fall in annual CV of 2% for the period. The 
substantial growth in mobile and Internet networks (330% and 380%, respectively) also corresponds 
with a decline in annual CV for the mobile and Internet networks of 54% and less than 1%, 
respectively. 
 
Further, Table IV provides an overview of changes to the mobile and fixed-line service price ratio. 
Mean values for 1996 and 1998 indicate annual mobile telephone subscription price is almost double 
that for fixed-line subscription. Sample standard deviations indicate substantial cross-country 
variation. For example, 1996, highest price mobile subscription (France) is higher than fixed-line 
telephony by a factor of 10. At 2000, the subscription price of mobile telephony in Korea (the highest 
in the sample) is almost 7 times higher than that for fixed-line telephony. Thus, the increase in 
consumer welfare induced due to an expansion in mobile telephony subscription is constrained by the 
relatively high subscription price.6 
 
Table IV. Mobile and Fixed-line Service Price Ratio 
Year Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
1996 2.64 1.89 0.64 9.95 
1998 2.43 1.74 0.25 6.92 
2000 1.29 1.23 0.01 6.60 
 
Finally, Internet service expenditure is a relatively small proportion of communications expenditure 
compared to that for mobile telephony. Accordingly, the network effect induced by increased 
network size is less constrained than that for mobile telephony. However, since the subscription price 
includes the fixed-line subscription charge, it too is relatively constrained when compared to fixed-line 
access. These findings suggest that concentrating solely on the welfare impact of price falls yields an 
underestimate of consumer benefit. That is, while the direct effect from a price fall in 
                                                     
6 The economic constraint is reflected in the size of the price and income coefficients across services. 
1
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telecommunications networks matters, indirect benefit from subsequent network expansion is also 
important. This finding has important consequences for the conduct of universal service policy. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
This study uses Hausman’s (1981) CV approach to measure the direct consumer welfare change from 
a price fall and an indirect network externality effect. The study demonstrates a method to obtain 
exact estimates of welfare change. Once econometric price and income parameter estimates are 
obtained the corresponding change in consumer welfare is calculated. Additionally, this study 
demonstrates the importance of controlling for the network effect to obtain an accurate assessment 
of the total impact on consumer welfare. Estimates indicate a direct increase in welfare from a 
subscription price fall is at most 0.2% of income. However, larger indirect welfare increases occur via 
a network effect. Surprisingly, mobile telephony welfare increases appear to provide the smallest 
improvement. However, this result is explained by a high mobile subscription price when compared 
to fixed-line telephony and Internet service prices. That is, the relatively high mobile subscription 
price constrains the network effect. Finally, study findings support competition policy designed to 
place downward pressure on subscription prices. The study provides indirect justification for the 
continuation of universal service policy. 
 
While the empirical estimates of CV for telephony and Internet networks contained in this study are 
revealing, it is important to note that the underlying source of welfare gains differ by network. That is, 
the network effects linked to (fixed-line and mobile) point-to-point communication services differ 
from that due primarily to information services. Conversely, information service growth is related to 
the installed base of terminals, in particular connected PCs. Accordingly, fixed and mobile telephones 
mostly generate communications network effects and, so far, few information service effects (which 
could change with the emergence of the 3rd generation mobile telephony and growth in mobile data 
markets). Additionally, the Internet generates mostly information service network effects, typically 
through e-mail, the dominant but not exclusive use. This latter network externality is very important 
because the quantity and quality of data available on the Web is highly correlated with the size of 
network subscriber base. Further, it is reasonable to expect that this Internet communications 
externality will become increasingly important. Finally, as the model cannot distinguish these effects, 
the results are likely to underestimate the true impact of Internet network growth on CV. 
 
 
Appendix : Hausman’s approach and proof of equation (2) 
 
 
Consider the  dynamic and deterministic demand system specified by Madden et al. (2004), 
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where is consumer demand for network  at time , under price level ,i tN i t ,i tP , and  is consumer’s 
income at time . Terms  and reflect the own-network and cross-network externalities, 
respectively. 
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t tiF , tiG ,
 
Allowing price  and income iP Y to vary at time t from their observed levels  and , the 
uncompensated demand function  is defined: 
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The linear uncompensated demand function, , derives from its generating quadratic indirect 
utility function, , through Roy’s identity : 
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Following Hausman (1981), to enable a valid welfare comparison to be made, before and after a price 
change, requires that the consumer remain at constant utility Ut , i.e., on a same indifference curve. If 
price of service i departs from at time t, to remain on the same indifference curve requires that, tiP,
1
2 
simultaneously, income departs from . Denoting  the expenditure function, i.e. the current 
income associated with current price  along a constant utility path, Roy’s identity implies: 
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The solution to differential equation (A4) is : 
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in which the constant of integration (reflecting the invariance of utility) derives from the initial 
condition : ttit YPY )( ,
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Hence, finally: 
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From the expenditure function , the compensated demand function  is derived as: )( it PY )( i
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Now consider a virtual transition from time t to time t + 1, in which the price falls from to 
 and income is simultaneously lowered from  to 
tiP,
titi PP ,1, 
 tY ttit YPY 
 )( 1, , in order to make the 
consumer insensitive to the price fall. The difference, or ‘compensating variation’, 
, is the income reduction which offsets the price fall benefit to the consumer. 
Conversely,  is a measure of the consumer’s welfare gain due to the price reduction from 
to . 
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The explicit expression of , as in equation (2), then derives from (A7) and (A8), i.e.: tiCV ,
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